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Résumé: La fin du monopole des agences publiques de placement dans la plupart des pays
de l’OCDE permet aux agences de travail temporaire de développer leur activité de re-
crutement en emploi permanent. Dans le cadre d’un modèle d’appariement, cet article
montre, dans un premier temps, que la concurrence sur le marché des placements facilite
le retour à l’emploi des chômeurs. Cette amélioration du marché du travail se réalise
sous certaines conditions : eﬃcacité significativement plus élevée de l’agence privée, faible
niveau du salaire de réservation. Cet article illustre, dans un second temps, le désintérêt
des agences privées envers les travailleurs peu qualifiés plus nombreux et plus diﬃciles à
placer. L’introduction d’une subvention au placement d’un travailleur peu qualifié corrige
cet eﬀet et permet de réduire le taux de chômage.
Mots-clé: Chômage, Modèle d’appariement, Services Publics de l’Emploi, Agences privées.
Classification J.E.L: J60, J63, J64, J68
Abstract: This paper deals with the consequences of the existence of private employment agen-
cies on the labor market. Using a matching framework, we study the conditions of existence
of private employment agencies and the consequences of competition on the market for
job placement. We show that the private employment agencies enter in the labour market
only if they are much more eﬃcient than the private agency. Moreover, the level of the
unemployment benefits is a disincentive to manage workers for the private agency. Because
of a high fallback position for the worker, it is costly for the private employment agency
to manage a worker having some low probabilities to exit from unemployment. If these
conditions are satisfied, the existence of private employment agencies improve the labor
market through shorter unemployment spells and a lower unemployment rate. Moreover,
an improvement in the matching process is an incentive for the firms to post vacancies at
the private agencies. Nevertheless, the workers managed by the private agencies receive
some lower wages than the other workers because of the payment by the firm for recruiting
a worker. Finally, we show that private employment agencies have a natural disincentive
to manage unskilled workers. But, the introduction of a subsidy to match an unskilled
worker with a vacancy seems to be a suﬃcient incentive to make the private employment
agencies managing unskilled workers.
Keywords: Unemployment, Matching model, Public employment agencies, Private employ-
ment agencies
J.E.L Classification: J60, J63, J64, J68
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1 Introduction
A lack of transparency causes problems in matching labor supply and demand. The fact that the
information required to make the transactions on the labor market is costly, makes it reasonable
to have institutions that facilitate a more eﬃcient exchange. Examples of such information
channels are newspapers advertisements, informal contacts. The role of placement services can
be regarded as an other intermediary in the labor market. They take the role of match-makers
who narrow down the set of employers and workers and reduce uncertainty on both side of the
labor market.
The coexistence of high unemployment and vacancies raises questions about the eﬃciency
of the public employment services. Empirical studies report that job seekers using public em-
ployment agencies have longer unemployment spells than those using other methods (see Car-
penter and Wieglosz, 1987, Holzer, 1988, Blau and Robbins, 1990, for the US, Osberg, 1993,
for Canada, Böheim and Taylor, 2002, for United Kingdom, Addison and Portugal, 2002 for
Portugal). Since the early 1990s the tasks and the organisation of job placement have been
undergoing comprehensive changes in all OECD countries. Private agencies are starting to play
a more important role in the area of job placement, which has been dominated by public ser-
vices for decades. Placement services can now be oﬀered either by public or by private agencies.
Until 2005, France had a moderate monopoly system where private employment services were
banned. However there were ways to get around these restrictions. Due to the recent law of
social cohesion, France can ratify the ILO-convention concerning private employment agencies.
Particularly, temporary work agencies are allowed to develop their activities to open permanent
jobs too. From now on, each private agency can propose, within the law, a service of placement
to unemployed and a service of recruitment to the firms.
The Public Employment Services (PES) are set up by government or regional authorities,
whereas private employment services are established as a result of private initiative. PES provide
their services free of charge, while private employment services usually charge a fee and operate
with the purpose of making profit. There is a wide set of types of private employment services.
Headhunters provide an example of an agency service targeted at the labor market for high-
skilled workers. Temporary work agencies are an important category of private services. They
do not place job-seekers permanently but only for a limited period of time. Although the use of
public placement services is basically voluntary, there is an obligation for insured unemployed
workers to report to the employment service at regular intervals. In contrast there has never
been an obligation on the part of the employers to register job vacancies with the employment
services.
In general, the market share of the PES is higher than those of private employment services,
and the two categories of job placement agencies complement each other. Indeed, they serve
diﬀerent types of unemployed workers. Private employment services typically take care of the
placement of already employed and highly qualified job seekers. However, there is a potential
competition between public and private employment services for the placement of low skilled
unemployed workers.
The aim of this paper is to analyze the eﬃciency of a labor market where there is a com-
petition on the "market" for job placement (private and public employment agencices). In the
economic literature dealing with employment agencies, little attention has been devoted to pro-
viding a model in which firms can explicitly choose between alternative employment agencies
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(public or private) to fill their vacancies. The analyses of Pissarides (1979) and Yavas (1994)
consider the role of an intermediary on the labor market causing a triangular relation between
the agency, the firm and the worker. Yavas set up a formal framework for analyzing the eﬃciency
of a labor market with placement agencies. The essential hypothesis is that an agency can en-
sure a better match between unemployed workers and vacancies than individual job search can.
However, this analysis does not consider the simultaneous use of several job search methods. In
addition, the complexity of the analysis does not make it possible to determine the remuneration
of the employment agency. The article of Pissarides (1979) primarily aims at modelling the role
of the public employment agencies. The remuneration of this intermediary is exogenous. Job
seekers and firms with vacancies search the other side of the market through the employment
agency and on the labor market. The policy implication is that the agency should try to en-
courage private search activity rather than oﬀer incentives to firms to register more of their
vacancies. Therefore, in the contributions of Pissarides (1979) and Yavas (1994), there is no
competition between two types of employment agencies. Instead these two papers contributes
to explain the role of an intermediary on labor market eﬃciency. More recently, Neugart and
Storrie (2002) consider the role of temporary work agencies as matching intermediaries on the
labor market. They show that the growth of these temporary work agencies does not necessarily
crowd out permanent jobs.
In a more applied framework, our model, focused on two matching processes, allows us to
consider explicitly the interaction between, on the one hand, employers and public/private em-
ployment agencies and, on the other hand, between job seekers and public/private employment
agencies. More precisely the aim of our paper is to illustrate the trade-oﬀ between opening a
vacancy in a public employment agency or in private ones. In the public employment agency,
firms face a high number of registered job seekers. But according to empirical studies quoted
above, the matching process through this channel is less eﬃcient. For a given number of job
seekers and vacant jobs, the higher the number of matches, the more eﬃcient the matching
process. In the private employment agency, firms face few registered job seekers and have to
pay a fee for recruiting one of them. But the matching process is more eﬃcient.
In this paper, we extend the model of Diamond (1981), Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides
(2000) by assuming two matching channels. Private employment agencies are an additionnal
way of search for the unemployed workers. Firms have choice to post their vacancies in public
employment agencies without cost or in private ones. In the latter case, if the vacancy is filled,
the firm has to pay a fee to the private agency. Unemployed workers need to register to the public
employment agency in order to receive their unemployment benefits. They can also be contacted
by private agencies to access a job. Public or private employment agencies can not charge any
fees from job seekers. Because of the "no fees to staﬀ" principle, private employment agencies
may not request any fees from job seekers (Walwei, 2001). The main contributions of our paper
are the followings. First, competition on the "market" for job placement makes the return to
employment easier for job seekers. This improvement of the labor market is possible under some
conditions : higher eﬃciency of the private employment agencies, lower fall-back position of the
unemployed workers and the fees charged by the private agency should be reasonable. Second,
we show that private employment agencies are more interested in the highest skilled workers. A
subsidy for the placement of unskilled workers is a good motivation for private agencies to place
them into an appropriate job. This is in line with the French subcontracting situation where the
public employment agency pay private ones in return for the placement of unemployed workers
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in long lasting jobs.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in section 2. We present the
comparative static results in a case where wages are exogenous. This section sums up in a very
simple way the eﬀect of an additionnal job search channel. In section 3, wages are endogenized
and we conduct a quantitative analysis. We show that the presence of additional employment
agencies influences the decision of the firms to open vacancies and aﬀects the outflow from
unemployment. The introduction of an eﬃcient private employment agency rise employment
but to a lesser degree than with exogenous wages. In section 4, we discuss the eﬃciency of the
competition between types of placement agencies when the fees charged by the private agencies
are endogenous. We illustrate how the matching of a vacancy with a job seeker aﬃliated with a
private agency influence the "price of placement" perceived by the private agency. In section 5,
we consider two types of workers. We analyze the behavior of the firms and the private agencies
in this context. Concluding comments are provided in section 6.
2 The model
2.1 A matching model with several employment agencies
We assume that the workers can be in 4 diﬀerents states: unemployed workers using exclusively
public employment agency (U), unemployed workers using public and private employment agen-
cies (A), employed workers through public agency (G) and employed workers through private
agencies (P ). It will be assumed that there is no unemployed workers using exclusively private
agencies, because they may be registered to the public agency in order to receive unemployment
benefits. The size of the labor force is constant and is denoted: u+ a+ g + p = 1 where g and
p are respectively the employment rate in the states G and P . The unemployment rate in this
model is also determined by u+ a ; where u denotes the unemployed workers using exclusively
the public agency and a the unemployed workers using the both network.
The figure 1 sums up the equilibrium flows on the labor market. To simplify, let’s say that
U is the pool of unemployed people using the only public unemployment agency, and A.is the
pool of unemployed people using the both network (public and private).
Let Si denote the number of job seekers in state i = G,P,A and Vi the number of vacancies
in state i. The number of job matches per unit of time is give by : Mi = QiV
φ
i S
1−φ
i where Qi
is the matching eﬃciency, φ is the elasticity of the matching function with respect to vacancies.
The probability of filliing a vacancy is then
Mi
Vi
≡ mi (θi), where θi =
Vi
Si
is the tightness of the
labor market in sector i. The bigger tightness θi, the smaller the probability to fill a vacancy.
Symmetrically, the probability of finding a job for a job seeker is θim (θi) =
Mi
Si
, the larger θi,
the bigger the probability of finding a job.
The number of job seekers concerned the the matching function is then, in each state i :
Sa = u, Sp = a, Sg = u+ a. The private unemployment agencies search people to manage in the
pool of unemployed workers using the only public agency network. The vacancies of firms using
the private network are filled by unemployed using the private unemployment agencies services.
The vacancies posted in the public unemployment agencies can be filled by the whole unemloyed
people (u+ a).
An unemployed becomes employed by the public agency network with probability θgmg (θg).
She can be registered in a private agency with the rate θama (θa). The private agency determines
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G P
U A
amaa 
qa
gmgg  pmpp 
gmgg 
q
q
Figure 1: Equilibrium flows on the labor market with two employment agencies.
the optimal number of unemployed workers to manage, depending of the expected gains. The
change of state between U and A can be interpreted as a search process between unemployed
workers and private agencies looking for workers to manage and place in some firms of their
network. This process takes time and is captured by the matching function Ma. θa is the
tightness of the job placement market. A worker who is registered in a private agency obtains
has some job oﬀersat rate θpmp (θp). We assume the workers accept the first job they are oﬀered.
We denote the job destruction rate by q.When a worker lose her job, she enters the pool
of unemployed U . This hypothesis is realistic, since in the most OECD countries, unemployed
workers have to register at unemployment agency to get unemployment benefits. We suppose
that a unemployed worker registered by a private agency faces a risk of having her file deleted.
Such shocks occur at rate qa.
The steady-state flows equilibrium is determined by:
θgmg (θg)u+ θgmg (θg) a = qg (1)
qg + qp+ qaa = θgmg (θg)u+ θama (θa)u (2)
θama (θa)u = qaa+ θgmg (θg) a+ θpmp (θp) a (3)
θpmp (θp) a = qp (4)
2.2 The behavior of firms
Firms choose the optimal way to post vacancies : in private or public agency. Vacancies posted
in the public agency are matched with pool of unemployed workers of measure u+ a, when the
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vacancies posted at the private agency are matched with pool of unemployed worker of measure
a. Then the probability to fill a vacancy by the public network is ceteris paribus, stronger than
in the private agency. But the eﬃciency of the matching function in the private agency is bigger.
In counterpart, the firms have to pay the private unemployment agency if the job is filled by
its network. Let us explain the diﬀerence in eﬃciency of the matching process between the two
types of employment agencies. The public agency face a high number of unemployed workers
because of the compulsory registration for receiving unemployment benefits. As a result, the
management of all these files is more diﬃcult. Furthermore, the more eﬃcient matching process
through the private agency can be explained by a reputation eﬀect. When a firm wants to hire
a worker, she does not know anything about the quality of the worker. The employment agency
reduces this uncertainty. In order to keep up her reputation, the agency is encouraged to propose
the right worker to the firm. By the way, a survey of Hasluck and Purcell (1987) reports that
70% of british interviewed firms appreciate the quality and the selectivity of the workers that
the private agencies propose to them. In other words, a private employment agency is more
concerned by a reputation eﬀect than an individual worker because the agency anticipates the
possible expected gains following the placement of a worker4.
The probability to fill a vacancy via the public agency is mg (θg) = Qg
µ
Vg
Sg
¶φ−1
, while
the probability to fill a vacancy via the private agency is mp (θp) = Qp
µ
Vp
Sp
¶φ−1
. The fact
Sg = u + a > Sp = a may incitate firms to declare vacancies in the public agency, because of
a bigger pool of job seekers. But, the scale parameters Qp > Qg may incitate firms to declare
their vacancies in the private agency. This captures the eﬃciency trade-oﬀ faced by firms.
It is assumed that the private agency receives payment (from the firm) only when a vacancy
is filled via the private agency. In equilibrium, firms are indiﬀerent between posting vacancies
in the private agency or posting vacancies in the public agency
The expected profit for a firm using the public network.
Let Πv,g be the expected profit from a vacancy posted in the public unemployment agency,
and Πg the expected profit from a job filled through the public agency. When the job is vacant
and posted in a public agency, it costs hg per unit time. It is filled at endogenous rate mg (θg).
The net return of filling the job is Πg−Πv,g. Each filled job yields a net return y− p, where y is
the is real output and wg is the cost of labor for a worker. At rate qp, the job is destroyed and
becomes vacant. Then the firm chooses to post the vacant job in the public or in the private
unemployment agency according to the respective expected profits. This assumption is not very
important because of the free entry condition, implying a zero profit on any vacancy. Indeed,
firms will open vacancies until the expected profit from a vacancy falls to zero.
rΠv,g = −hg +mg (θg) [Πg −Πv,g] (5)
rΠg = y −w + q {max [Πv,g,Πv,p, 0]−Πg} (6)
The expected profit for a firm using the private network
4Let us remark that private agencies with a good reputation will be attracted by the "best" unemployed
workers. Unskilled workers or long term unemployed workers who are "hard-to- place" will stay in the network
of the public agency. We come back to this point later in the paper.
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Firms can choose to post the vacant job in the private unemployment agency. Posting
a vacant job in the public agency implies no cost but hg. But the services of the private
unemployment agency is costly. If the vacnacy is filled, the private agency is paid a price Ω > 0
by the firm. This amount is paid once, when the job is filled.
Let Πv,p denote the expected profit on a vacant job posted in the private agency and Πp
denote the expected profit of a job filled by the way of the private agency. Then,
rΠv,p = −hp +mp (θp) [−Ω+Πp −Πv,p] (7)
rΠp = y −w + q {max [Πv,g,Πv,p, 0]−Πp} (8)
A vacancy posted in the private agency costs5 hp each unit of time, and the job can be filled at
rate mp (θp) . The firm pays the agency for the placement service at price Ω. Then filled, it is
assumed that the productivity is independant of the way the vacancy was filled and is y. The
cost of labor for a worker is wp.
In equilibrium, the expected profit from jobs posted at public agency must equal the expected
profit from job posted at private agency:
Πv,g = Πv,p
2.3 The behavior of the private unemployment agency
The private employment agency works as other firms It meets, between the u unemployed people,
some workers they could manage and match. It posts some vacant "files" and searches between
the unemployed to fill these files. If there’s a match between an unemployed and the file, the
file is "filled". This state is denoted P . The agency succeeds in placing the worker in a job at
rate θpmp (θp) upon which, it receives a payment Ω.
Let Πv,a denote the expected profit from file in the private agency and let Πp,a denote the
expected profit from a managed unemployed worker:
rΠv,a = −ha +ma (θa) [Πp,a −Πv,a] (9)
rΠp,a = −f + θpmp (θp) [max [Πv,a, 0] +Ω−Πp,a] + θgmg (θg) [max [Πv,a, 0]−Πp,a]
+qa [Πv,a −Πp,a] (10)
Similarly to ordinary firms, the search for people workers to manage is costly, the flow-cost is
denoted by ha. It can meet some workers at rate ma (θa) . It is assumed that managing a worker
is costly (appointments, searching for the most eﬃcient match, etc.) ; this cost is denoted by f .
The agency succeeds in matching a managed unemployed worker at rate θpmp (θp), upon which
the file of the worker is deleted and a new one can be opened. A placement brings back Ω. We
assume that an unemployed worker managed by the private agency continues to receive oﬀers
from the public agency6. The agent can then be hired by a firm using the public agency network
and then give up the private agency at rate θgmg (θg). In such a case, the file of the worker at
5These costs take into account the expenses for the search of an employee and particularly the the fees paid
to the private agency. Implicitly, we assume that the cost of a vacancy posted in the public agency is lower than
in a private agency, because of the fees charge by the firms of the private network.
6 Indeed, because of the obligation to be registered in the public agency to perceive the unemployment benefits,
unemployed workers remain in contact with it.
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the private agency is deleted, and the private agency decides whether or not to create a new
vacant file Finally, files in private agency face a risk of being exogenously deleted. Exogenoeous
deletions occur at rate qa.
2.4 The labor market equilibrium
A description of the labor market equilibrium requires us to pin down the labor market tightness
θg, θp, θa. At the free-entry equilibrium, the value of a vacancy is zero, employers are indiﬀerent
beteween posting vacancies in either one of the agency types. Independancce of the way it is
posted (public/private), and consequentlyin either one of the typesis zero, wherever it is posted.
Employers are then indiﬀerent where to post their vacancies (public or private agency)
Since Πv,g = 0, equation (5) can then be written as Πg =
hg
mg(θg) , an upon subsitution into
(6), we have the labor demand via the public agency:
hg
mg (θg)
=
y − w
r + q
(11)
This labor demand is such that the expected costs of a vacancy (left term) equals the expected
profit of a filled job (right term of the equation). Because the probability of filling a vacancy
decreases with the tightness indicator, the relation (11) defines an increasing relation between
the wage wg and the tightness indicator θg on the labor market G.
Likewise the free-entry condtion, Πv,p = 0 implies that the labor demand adressed to the
private agency is given as:
hp
mp (θp)
=
y − w
r + q
− Ω (12)
Equation (12) defines a decreasing relation between θp and wp.
Since the free-entry assumption (Πv,a = 0) and equations (9) and (10), we obtain the follow-
ing expression for the managing demand from the private employment agency:
ha
ma (θa)
=
−f + θpmp (θp)Ω
r + θpmp (θp) + θgmg (θg) + qa
(13)
The existence of the private agency is then conditional on its placement eﬃciency. For given
values of θp and θg, relation (13) has a solution if an only if the following condition is satisfied:
θpmp (θp)Ω > f (14)
Indeed, it follows from equation (13) that θa, the indicator of tightness of the placement market,
is positive if and only if the net output of matching a managed worker with a vacancy is
positive. In other words, the net remuneration of the agency for placing an unemployed worker
must outweight the average cost of placing a managed unemployed.
From relations (11) and (12) we see that:
Ω =
hg
mg (θg)
− hp
mp (θp)
(15)
Ω = h
µ
1
mg (θg)
− 1
mp (θp)
¶
pour h = hg = hp (16)
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It follows that firms are willing to pay a private agency if the agency generates faster matching,
i.e the average vacancy spell duration of a vacancy posted at the private agency (given by the
ratio 1/mp (θp)) is shorter than the average vacany spells of a job posted in the public agency.
2.5 The comparative statics at the equilbrium
Finally, when wages are negotiated, the labor market equilibrium is defined by equations (11),
(12) and (13). Table 1 presents the comparative statics properties of the labor market equilib-
rium. We present shortly the impact of a subset of parameters to illustrate how the model works.
The calculus of this comparative statics are detailed in Appendices. A quantitative analysis is
made in further section.
hg hp ha q w y Ω Qp
θg − 0 0 − − + 0 0
θp 0 − 0 − − + − +
θa + − − ? ? ? ? +
Table 1: Comparative statics in steady state equilibrium
The cost of posting a vacancy
An increase in hg leads to an increase in the average cost of posting a vacancy at the public
employment agency. The labor demand through the public agency decreases. That implies an
increase in the unemployment rate. The private agency has less diﬃculties to find unemployed
workers to manage. The private employment agency looks for more unemployed workers to
manage, leading to an increase in θa. The probability to be aﬃliated with a private agency for
an unemployed worker increases
An increase in hp leads to an increase in the cost of posting a vacancy at the private agency.
Firms react by posting less vacancies in the private agency. That leads to a decrease in θp, ceteris
paribus. The probability to find a job through the private employment agency decreases. In turn,
the expected profit from managing an unemployed worker for the private agency falls (following
equation (10)). The private agency lower the number of job seekers to manage, implying a fall
in θa. Consequently, the unemployed workers have a lower probability to be aﬃliated with a
private agency.
An increase in ha has no influence on tightness indicators θg and θp. Because of the increase
in the search costs for the private agency, it manages less workers, leading to a decrease in the
tightness indicator on the market of placement θa.
The level of wages
An increase in wage decrease the expected profit on a filled job (relations (6) et (8)). Firms
react by posting less vacancies. Two opposite eﬀects take place.
On the one hand, posting less vacancies, the probability of exiting from unemployment
decreases. That leads to an increase in the unemployment rate. It is easier for the private
agency to find workers to manage. Because of a decrease in the average search cost to manage
workers, the private agency has an incentive to search some workers to manage: : θa increases.
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On the other hand, firms, posting less vacancies at the private agency, contributes to lower
the tightness of the labor market of the private network : θp. That means the private agency has
more diﬃculties to match its managed workers with a vacancy. The expected profit of managing
an unemployed worker decreases. This eﬀect is a disincentive of managing unemployed workers,
and leads to a decrease in θa.
The job destruction rate
Equations (11), (12) and (13) show that an increase in the job destruction rate q is equivalent
to an increase in the wage. The eﬀects on θa are not obvious.
Job productivity
With an increase in y, the expected profit from a filled job increases, creating an incentive
to post vacancies. Because of more vacancies, the probability of exiting from unemployment
increases. The unemployment rate falls. It becomes harder to find unemployed workers to
manage : the average cost of posting a vacancy at the private agency raises, leading to a decreases
in θa. But, because of the more vacancies, especially in the private agency, the unemployement
exit rate through the private agency increases. The private agency has less diﬃculties to match
workers with vacancies, increasing the expected utility from having a managed unemployed
worker. This mechanism is an incentive to look for more unemployed workers to manage.
Finally, the eﬀect on θa in ambiguous
The eﬃciency of the private employment agency
A higher eﬃciency in the matching process of the private agency increases the probability to
fill vacancies through the private agency, leading to a decrease in the average cost of vacancies.
Ceteris paribus, firms post more vacancies at the private agency and θp raises. The private
agency match workers and vacancies faster (θpm (θp) increases). That leads to an increase in
the expected utility from managing an unemployed worker ; the private agency looks for more
workers to manage and θa increases. Finally, a higher eﬃciency of the private matching function
increases the probability of exiting from unemployment through the private agency (increase in
.θpmp (θp)). That leads to a higher expected profit of managing a worker, and an incentive to
look from job seekers to manage.
The price of placement
The eﬀect the price of placement on the tightness indicator of the market of placement is
ambiguous. On the one hand, when Ω increases the private employment agency has a higher
expected profit from managing a worker. It looks for more unemployer workers to manage,
leading to a higher θa. On the other hand, the increase in the price of placement Ω leads to
an increase in the expected cost of posting a vacancy. at the private agency. Firms reduce the
vacancies posted at the private agency. Formally, θp decreases ceteris paribus. That leads to a
decrease in the exit rate from unemployment through the private agency θpmp (θp). In other
words, the private agency has more diﬃculties to match workers with vacancies. The expected
profit from managing a worker is lower. This eﬀect is a disincentive to manage workers, leading
to a decrease in the tightness indicator of the market of placement θa. Finally, the eﬀect of Ω on
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θa is not determined. The eﬀect due to the increase in the expected profit of the private agency
increases θa ; but the indirect eﬀect on the expected cost of posting a vacancy at the private
agency is a disincentive of using the private agency, decreasing the expected profit of the private
agency.
It is interesting to note that the introduction of a private employement agency induces some
network and congestion eﬀects, aﬀecting the exit rate from unemployment and the vacancies
opening decisions. The consideration of a further search method influences also the wage settings.
3 The eﬀects of the introduction of a private employment agency
We assume that wages are negotiated. The introduction of a private employment agency is an
additionnal search method, it will modify wages settings and then the level of employment. We
present in this section to analyse the consequences of a competition on the placement labor
market. In a first time the behavior of workers is presented (3.1), and in a second time, we
analyse the wage bargaining process(3.2). We end the section by a quantitative (simulated)
analysis of the model (3.3).
3.1 The behavior of workers
Let Vg denote the expected utility of an employee getting her job through the public agency
(state G), Vp denote the expected utility of an employee getting her job through the private
agency (state P ), Vu the expected utility of an unemployed using only the PSE (state U) and Va
the expected utility of an unemployed worker using both the public AND private unemployment
agencies (state A)7.
rVg = wg + q [Vu − Vg] (17)
A worker employed in state G, is paid wg per unit of time. She looses her job at rate q and then
becomes unemployed (state U).
The value function of an employee matched by private agency reads:
rVp = wp + q [Vu − Vp] (18)
Beeing employed in state P , the worker earns a wage wp per unit of time. Job destruction shocks
occur at rate q, then the worker becomes unemployed in state U . It is the assumed that each
unemployed is initially in state U . This state is a condition to be registered as unemployed and
to perceive unemployment benefits. This registration in the public employment agencies SPE
is an obligation in most of the OECD countries. We assume that once the worker is hired, he
loose her links with the private employment agency.
The expected utility of an unemployed using only the public unemployment agency services
reads:
rVu = b+ θgmg (θg) [Vg − Vu] + θama (θa) [Va − Vu] (19)
An unemployed worker in the public agency receives an amount b of unemployment benefits.
At rate θgmg (θg) she is matched with a firm through the public agency and becomes employed
7We assume that agents are risk neutral. This assumption excludes the most important function of the
unemployment benefits but allows to underline that allocations influence on placement is not the same than
unemployment insurance.
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in state G. The unemployed worker can also match with the private agency at rate θama (θa),
after which she remain unemployed but access to the private network oﬀers. His expected utility
is denoted Va and is written :
rVa = b+ θpmp (θp) [Vp − Va] + θgmg (θg) [Vg − Va] + qa [Vu − Va] (20)
If registered at a private agency, the unemployed worker receives oﬀers from the public agency
and reveives oﬀers through the private network as well. At rate θgmg (θg), she is matched with
a firm through the public agency network8. The private agency can also match the unemployed
worker : at rate θpmp (θp), he meets a firm from the private network. The intrinsic idea is
obviously that the private agency will generate a better match than the public agency: in
particular because the private agency limit the number of its own unemployed workers and
because the public agency cannot and does not want to limit the number of unemployed workers
registred there. In other words there are less competition between the unemployed workers in
the private agency.
Comparison between equations (17), (18), (19) and (20) implies Vu < Va. The expected
utility of a worker using only the public agency is less than the expected utility of an unemployed
worker using also the private agency. Indeed, the managed worker has a shorter spelle of
unemployemnt because of the usage of both networks. Consequently, an unemployed worker
(state U) always has an interest to be aﬃliated with a private agency (state A).
3.2 Wages bargaining
We here assume that all wages are bargained. The price paid by a firm to hire a worker through
private agencies inflicts on the wage settings. Consequently, the wage bargained by a worker only
registered in the public agency is diﬀerent from the wage bargainged by an unemployed worker
aﬃliated also with a private employment agency. In both cases, the wages are set through Nash
bargaining.
Bargaining in state G
Consider a match between a worker and a firm with a vacancy posted in the public agency.
In the one hand, if the parties can agree on a wage, the worker becomes employed and has
expected utility Vg. In the other hand, if bargaining fails, the worker has the expected utility
Vu. For the firm, the fallback option is Πv,g. The wage is the result of the maximization of net
gains of workers and firms in state G
max
wg
[Vg − Vu]β [Πg −Πv,g]1−β (21)
where β is the bargaining power of workers. With (17), we can write the expected utility of an
employed worker in state G as :
Vg =
wg + qVu
r + q
8We could imagine a system with diﬀerent unemployment benefits according to the agency (public or private).
Every unemployed workers would receive the oﬀers of their network. Such a situation would caracterize a private
unemployment insurance system that would not be compulsory. As in Denmark, employment agencies would
propose unemployment benefits to eligible workers and a service of placement. The public employment agencies
would have to take care of non eligible unemployed workers.
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Implying to :
Vg − Vu =
wg − rVu
r + q
Also, with (6), we can obtain, at free-entry equilibirum , an expression of firms expected profit
if a vacancy if filled throught the public agency :
Πg =
y − wg
r + q
The first order condition of the program (21) yields the following expression for the settled wage
when the match was made through the public agency :
wg = βy + (1− β) rVu (22)
The worker obtains a share β of the surplus, and a share 1 − β of his fallback option. The
bargained wage is then an increasing function of the productivity y and of his reservation utility
rVu.
Bargaining in state P
If the bargaining is successfull, the expected utility of the worker is Vp and the expected
profit of firm is Πp−Ω, since the firm must pay the private agency for generating be successfull.
The reservation utility for unemployed workers registered at the private agency is Vu. Indeed,
we consider that the private agency proposes to the managed workers some jobs they have to
accept. If bargaining fails, we assume that the worker is excluded from the private agency. The
worker can benefit of its services again at rate θama (θa). Firms profit, if negotiations fail is
Πv,p. The wage wp is then the result of the following maximization program:
max
wp
[Vp − Vu]β [Πp − Ω−Πv,p]1−β (23)
With (18), we can write again the expected utility of a worker in state P de as follows :
Vp =
wp + qVu
r + q
Vp − Vu =
wp − rVu
r + q
Equation (8) can now be written :
Πp =
y − wp
r + q
The first order condition allows us defining the wage wp to a worker who obtained her job
through the private agency :
wp = β [y − (r + q)Ω] + (1− β) rVu (24)
wp = wg − β (r + q)Ω < wg pour Ω > 0 (25)
Hence, the wage obtained by workers aﬃliated with the private agencies is lower than the wage
obtained by workers placed by the public agency. This is a consequence of the payment for the
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private agency services which is eﬀectivly split between the fimr and the worker in the wage
bargaining. We showed that the private agency must be eﬃcient to come on the placement
market (equation (14)). It permits to workers to have some smaller unemployment spells. In
fine, it appears that these workers indirectly pay the cost of this private placement.
The improvement of the eﬃciency of the matching process has a positive influence on the
labor market tightness of the private network (θp increases). That increases the exit rate from
unemplyment through the private agencies. The bargained wages changes with this new search
possibility. The increase in bargaining wages could lower the positive eﬀects of the additive
eﬃcient search method. The simulation exercices following confim these intuitions.
3.3 A quantitative analysis
3.3.1 Calibration
The aim of the calibration done here is to depict a plausible situation of the labor market. We
calibrate the model without private agency is calibrated to represent the french labor market
situation.
The interest rate is fixed at 5%. We normalize the productivity of workers to 1. The
replacement ratio ρ is set at 55% of the wage. The job destruction rate is calibrated to represent
some employment flows in France, and the unemployment exit rate is set at 0.15. The costs of
vacancies posting (hg) and the public network matching eﬃciency (Qg) are set such that average
unemployment spell is around 11 months and the unemployment rate is 11.9%. In France in
2004, the average unemployment spell was 332 days, so 11 months(source ANPE 2004). We
assume that the elasticity of the matching function is 0.5 (cf Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)
for a survey of matching function estimations). The bargaining power of workers is set at 0.5,
implying the Hosios condition is satisfied. Table 2 summarizes the parameters of a situation
without private unemployment agency.
y ρ q Qg hg φi β r
1 .55 .15 1 .3 .5 .5 .05
Table 2: Calibration of the benchmark situation
To introduce the influence of the private employment agency, we propose the following cali-
bration. The private agency has to be suﬃciently eﬃcient to enter the market (see the equations
(13) and (14)). We set the scale parameter of the matching function 1.5. We assume that the
private unemployment agencies have some destruction rates higher than other destruction rates
(qa = .20)9. The costs of vacancies posted in the private agency are higher than those in the
public agency because of the incurend when using the private agency. We set the managing
costs for the private agency at f = .1, lower than the costs of blank files (ha = .2). Indeed, it
is easier for the private agency to meet people already in its files than to meet some unknow
people. Finally, we have to determine the price of the placement,.Ω. In Germany,10 where the
9The results of the model are robust, whatever the level of qa.
10The private agencies can freely propose their services at the unemployed workers and firms since 1994.
15
private agency remuneration is a function of the worker wage, the placement price is about 12
to 15% of the worker wage. In our case, we set Ω to 1, representing about 10% of the wage.
The introduction of a private unemployment agency with these parameters (Table 3) implies an
unemployment rate at 11.7%, a little lower than the case without private agencies. With these
characteristics, they register 2% of vacancies and realize 4% of hirings
Qp Qa qa hp ha f Ω
1.5 1.3 .2 .5 .2 .1 .1
Table 3: Calibration of parameters concerning the private unemploymoent agency
3.3.2 The impact of an further search method
The liberalization of employement agencies started in 1990’s in most countries; except in United
Kingdom where competition always existed. In France, this liberalization started at the begin-
ning 2005. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the impact of this further search method on
the French economy.
Impact of a higher eﬃciency of the job matching proposed by the private agency
We analyse here the eﬀects of the eﬃciency of the private agency. We showed that the private
agencies can paly a role on the labor market on ly if they are suﬃciently eﬃcient11 (cf equation
(14)). An increase in Qp signifies that private agencies are more eﬃcient in matching between
their managed workers and their client firms. The results of the simulations are represented in
figure 2.
With the increase in Qp, the average vacancy spellduration in private agencies falls. The
firms react by opening more vacancies in the private agency : the proportion of vacancies posted
at the private agency increasing from 2% to 15%. The tightness of the labor market of the private
agency θp increases. Then the probability of exit from unemployment θpmp (θp) is higher.
This in turn implies that workers have a higher fallback option in the bargaining process
leading to an increase in the bargained wage. Moreover , for the private agency, the expected
profit of managing a worker increases, giving it an incentive to manage more workers. The
workers have a higher probability of being contacted by the private agency. The workers benefit
a higher fallback option, then they bargain a higher wage, also in jobs obtainned through the
public agency (wg increases). Note that the unemployment exit rate through the public agency
decreases. Note this eﬀect is small and does not balance the increase in the probability to be
aﬃliated with a private agency. We also note than the bargained wages by workers managed by
private agencies are about 1% lower than the wages obtained by other workers.
Finally, the increase in posted vacancies following the introduction of an eﬃcient private
unemployment agency contributes to decrease the unemployment rate. Nevertheless, this de-
creasing is balanced by the wages increasing. The unemployment rate decreases about 1.8 point.
The figure 3 present the eﬀect of an improvement of the eﬃciency of the private unemployment
with rigid wages.
11This calibration implies, knowing equation (14), that the eﬃciency parameter must be as Qp ≥ 1.5.
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Figure 2: Impact of the eﬃciency of the private placement
The unemployment rate decreases about 2.4 points. Moreover, note that the more eﬃcient
the private agency is to obtain workers to manage, the larger is the decrease in the unemployment
rate : with Qa = 2, the unemployment rate decreases by 3 points. The welfare is here mesured
with an utilitarist criterium.. An increase in Qp implies a positive eﬀect on welfare because of
the decrease in the unemployment rate and the increase in wages.
Impact of the price of placement
Next, we study now the impact of the price asked by private agencies to match a vacany to
a worker on the the behavior of firms and workers. The results are represented in figure 4. We
vary the price between 10% and 55% of the wage.
An increase in Ω has two opposite eﬀects. On the one hand, for private agency, the profit
of matching a managed worker to a vacancy is increasing in the price of a match. On the other
hand, from using the private agency is decreasing in the price of a match.. These eﬀects occur
in two steps. In the first step, the increase in the price contribute to an increase in the private
agencies gain from managing a worker. The private agency meets more people and creates
more files, giving firms an incentive to post vacancies at private agencies. Indeed, because
unemployed are in private agencies, firms fill their vacancies faster. This leads to a decrease in
the unemployment rate and an increase in the welfare level of workers. For low values of the
price of placement, this eﬀect is dominant.
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Figure 3: Impact of the eﬃciency of the private agency when wages are exogenous
In the second step, the higher the Ω, the larger is the influence of the prices on the expected
profit.of a filled vacancy. The cost of using the private agency to fill a vacancy becomes too
high ; firms react by posting less vacancies in the private agencies. The tightness indicator θp
decreases, reducing the probability exit from unemployment by the private agencies. This eﬀect
is larger than the incentive to manage workers because of a higher placement price. In turn, that
implies an increase in the unemployment rate and a fall in welfare. Note that the consequences
on the unemployment rate are not very large : the unemployment rate, initially set at 11,7%,
decreases to 10,9% (for a placement price equal to 30% of wage). For a price equal to 55% of
wage, the unemployment rate reaches 11, 4%.
We can also note that workers coming from the private agency bargain lower wages than
the workers matched by the public agency. The larger is Ω, the larger is the wage gap between
workers using the private agency network and the ones using hte public agencies (from 1% to 5%).
The intuition is that the increase in the placemnt price reduces the surplus of the job. Indeed,
the employer considers the placement cost he has to pay if the bargaining suceeds and the job
is filled. Consequently, for the same bargaining power, the worker exiting from unemployment
by the private network has a lower wage and the employer a lower profit.
Eﬀects of an increase in unemployment benefits
The eﬀects of unemployment benefits are represented in the figure 5.
An increase in the unemployment benefits improve the situation of unemployed workers inde-
pendent of whether they are aﬃliated with the private employment agency or not (both increase
in Vu and Va). The unemployed workers bargain higher wages, wg and wp because of higher
fallback position. When the replacement ratio increases, the situation of unemployed workers
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Figure 4: Impact of the price of placement
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Figure 5: Impact of an increase in the unemployment benefits
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becomes closer to the situation of employees. The increase in wages makes the unemployment
rate increase. The relative profit to take a job is lower with a bigger replacement ratio. With
the increase in the wages, the profit of a job for a firm falls, because of a higher cost of labor.
As a consquence, firms post less vacancies. The higher unemployment rate makes it easier to fill
a posted vacancy, reducing firms’ incentive to use the costly and slithglty more eﬃcient private
agencies. Because of a higher reservation wage and diﬃculties in finding a job for the unem-
ployed, the private agencies have no incentive to manage workers : the number of unemployed
aﬃliated with the private agency decreases with the level of unemployment benefits.
We showed that the existence of an eﬃcient private employment agency can reduce the
unemployment rate. Indeed, the existence of a further additional on the labor market can make
increase exit from unemployment and reduce the vacancy spells. Nevertheless, the consideration
of wage bargaining reduces the positive eﬀects on the employment.
Notice that the more eﬃcient private agencies are in matching workers, the less incentive the
firm have to post vacancies in the public agencies. This has the feedback eﬀect that the relative
eﬃcicency of private agencies increase further, since the public agencies now have a smaller pool
un vacancies to fill. Hence, the competition , the competition on the market of the placement
can increase the ineﬃciency of the public agency. Nevertheless, the existence of the private
agency strongly depends of the situation of the labor market. Indeed, when unemployment is
high, firms do not have diﬃculties in filling their vacancie, and they have less incentive to pay
private agencies to fill their vacancies.
This study has assumed an exogenous price of matching an unemployed worker and a vacancy.
The mechanism is the following : the higher the price of finding a job for an unemployed, the
higher is the incentive to manage a worker. But the higher is the price, the less incentive to
firms to use the private agency to fill their vacancies. We showed the eﬀects of the price for
finding a worker for a firm are not obvious on unemployment.
We now consider the case where prices are endogenous and are determined by a bargaining
between firms and private agencies.
4 The eﬀects of competition when the price is endogenous.
In this section, we consider the case where the price of matching a worker with a vacancy is
determined by a bargaining between the firm having vacancies to fill and a private agency having
a worker to find a job for. First, we present the remuneration system of private agencies (4.1),
second, we study how this price system influence the level of unemployment. Especially, we will
analyse the influence of the parameters of the model on the resulting price(4.2).
4.1 The remuneration of the private employment agency
We assume that the private agency is paid by the firm it finding a job for. The price of this
service is assumed to be a bargaining between the private agency and the firm using the services
of the agency. This bargaining protocol is Nash bargaining, i.e the price of finding a worker for
a firm is the result of maximizing the product of net gains of the firm and the private agency.
If the bargaining process is successfull, the firm fill its job with the worker the agency proposes
to it. This service costs Ω to the firm, paid when the job is filled. The firm obtains then Πp−Ω
where Πp is still defined by the relation (8). The private agency earns the amount Ω. If the
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bargaining fails, the job stays vacant and the profit for the firm is Πv,p, it is defined by (7). The
private agency keeps the managed worker, and the profit is Πp,a, still defined by (10). Formally,
denoting γ ∈ ]0, 1[ the bargaining power of the firm on the price, the price is determined by the
maximization of the following program :
max
Ω
n
[−Ω+Πp −Πv,p]γ [Ω−Πp,a]1−γ
o
(26)
Using the free entry conditions, the surplus share is the as follows :
γ [Ω−Πp,a] = (1− γ) [−Ω+Πp]
·
r + θgm (θg) + qa
r + θgm (θg) + θpm (θp) + qa
¸
(27)
Then :
Ω = γ
−f
r + θgm (θg) + qa| {z }
Average gain for the private agency
to have a worker to find a job for.
+ (1− γ)
µ
y − wp
r + q
¶
| {z }
Expected gain for a firm
in case of filling the job
(28)
This expression takes the standard form of the Nash bargaining process.12. The placement price
is a linear combination of expected gain to have a worker to find a job for (for the private
unemployment agency), and the expected gains of a job filled with the private agency.
We supposed here that the firm was paying the private agency only once. We could imagine
a system of contributions paid each month. We show in the Appendices that these systems are
strictly equivalent.
4.2 Competition and price bargaining
We now present a quantitative analysis of the consequences of competition on the "finding a
job for" market when the price of finding a worker for a firm is bargained. The calibration is
the same than the one presented in section 3.3. We assume that the firm have a bargaining
power γ = 0.5. We discuss later the consequences of the level of the bargaining power γ. The
unemployment rate obtained in this situation (endogenous price) is 11.3%, a little lower than in
the exogeneous price case (11.7%). The level of the price Ω obtained with these characteristics
of the labor market is about 18% of the wage.
The consequences of a higher eﬃciency of the private agency
The eﬀects of an increase in Qp are close to those obtained in the case where the price was
exogenous. We recall the mechanisms, explaining the modifications in the price of finding a
worker for a firm. Figure 6 shows the eﬀect of an improving the the matching process when
the price is bargained.The improving in the private unemployment agency eﬃciency incitate
12The bargaining power can not be equal to 0 or 1. Indeed, if γ = 1, it comes with (28) and (10), Ω = Πp,a = 0.
The relation(9) implies then at the free entry equilibrium ha = 0. But ha is a non-zero parameter. In the same
way, if γ = 0, with (28) and (8), Ω = Πp = 0. The relation ((7) implies at the free entry equilibrium hp = 0. But
hp is a non-zero parameter, γ ∈ ]0, 1[.
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Figure 6: Impact of an increase in Qp when the price of placement is endogenous.
the firms to post their vacancies in it. The ratio of vacancies posted in the private agency
grows from 3.9% to 17%. Unemployed workers aﬃliated with the private agency have some
higher chances to exit from unemployment : the exit rate by this network is four time higher.
The expecter utility of this kind of unemployed (Va) increases. Because of a higher number
of vacancies posted in the private agency, it can find a job for a managed work more easily,
increasing its expected profit to have some unemployed workers to find a job for. Then the
private agency manages more unemployed. The unemployed have a higher probability to be
aﬃliated with a private agency, increasing their expected utility13 Vu. These eﬀects contribute
to reduce the unemployment rate, falling from 11.3% to 9.5%. Because of a higher fall-back
position, the workers bargain some higher wages. In particular, wp, the wage bargained by the
managed unemployed workers, increases. That implies a decrease in the expected profit on a
filled job in sector P . The bargaining rule described by (26) implies then, at the implique alors,
pour un pouvoir de négociation inchangé, une baisse du prix du placement qui passe de 18% à
15% du salaire pour Qp allant de 1.5 à 3.
The impact of firms bargaining power γ
Figure 7 present the impact of an increase in the bargaining power of firms. The increase in
13 Indeed, Va > Vu
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firms bargaining power when the private agency matches it with a worker implies a decrease in
the price the firm has to pay the agency. With this increase in the bargaingin power and the
induced decrease in the price of using private agencies, the firms are more likely to use private
agencies for posting their vacancies. The share of jobs posted at the private agencies increase
from 1% for γ → 0 to 4% for γ = 0.5. This is a result of the fact that private agencies have
less trouble matching workers and vacancies, leading private agencies to expand, thus increasing
θa. Unemployed workers aﬃliated only with the public agency now have a higher probability of
being contacted by a private agency that wants to manage that worker, thereby increasing the
expected utility of unemployed workers. This eﬀect lead to an increase in the unemployment
rate. The workers negotiate a higher wage because wp increases with γ (the bargaining power
of firms viz a viz agencies). The expected profit for a vacancy filled through the private agency
is decreasing with γ. During the price bargaining the higher the bargaining power of the firm
is, the lower is its expected profit on a filled vacancy.
There is a threshold below which private agencies are not making any profit. Obiviously the
lower the expected profit the less incentive do private agencies have to seek workers to manage.
The contact rate of private agencies decrease, and the firms observe the matching probability by
the private agencies falling, and consequently, they post less vacancies at the private agencies.
This phenomenon explains the decrease in the share of workers managed by private agencies if
the baragaining of firms becomes "too" high. This eﬀect works in the direction of increasing
the unemployment rate. Finally, the higher the share of workers managed by private agencies,
the larger the decrease in the unemployment rate. Consequently, if the firms negotiate a "too"
low price or if agencies suggest a "too" high price the albor market will not benefit from the
presence of private actors.
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Figure 7: Impact of the bargaining power of the firms γ.
How does the price of placement vary with the parameters of the model?
We are interested in the qualitative impact of a subset of parametes on the price of placements
Ω. The results are reported in figure 8.
• An increas in the bargaining power of workers push the bargained wage up. This dimishes
the expected profit of a filled vacacy. At the time of negotiation of the price of placements
the rent of the firm is lower implying a lower bargained price.
• The eﬀect of an increase in unemployment benefit is exactly the same as the eﬀect of an
increase in bargaining power. Improving the expected utility of unemployed workers, the
unemployment benefit improves the eﬀective bargaining power of prospective employee
during wage bargaining. The lowe the fallback option of unemployed workers, the higher
the share of unemployed workers managed by the private agency.
• An increase in the destruction rate q reduces the average spell-duration of jobs. It induce
a fall in the expected profit of firms, which then negotiating a lower price of placement
with the private agencies.
• An increase in hp leads to an increase of the average cost of vacacies posted in the private
agencies, and therefore leads toa decrease in the number fo vacancies posted in the private
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agencies. Ceteris paribus, since fewer firms post vacncies at the private agencies, those
firms that do have a higher probability to fill their vacancies. Conesquently, they accept
to pay a higher price Ω.
• Following the same logic, when ha increase, the cost for the private agency of managing a
worker is higher, so the private agency reduce the number of workers it manages. Firms
realize this, and post fewer vacancies at the private agencies. For the firms continuing to
post thir vacancies in the private agency, this implies that they face a higher probability
of having their vacacies filled, so the price of a placement increases with ha. The eﬀect of
qa are equivalent.
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Figure 8: Impact of parameters on the price of placement (Ω)
We have in this section considered the case where workers are homogenous. The price of the
placement is correspondingly the price the firm is willing to pay to fill their vacancies quicker,
and at the same time, it is thge price that makes private agencies enter the market and accepting
to fille the vacancies posted by firms. What happens if we consider to types of workers, say,
skilled and unskilled workers? What is the price the firm is willing to pay to recruite an unskilled
worker? And what is the price the private agency want in order to match an unskilled worker?
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5 Opening the market for placements with two types of workers
A critique often raised towards private agencies is that they are only interested in highly em-
ployable workers rather than less employeable workers (longterm unemployed workers, old un-
employed workers and unskilled unemployed workers). This concern is raised because private
firms, and therefore private agencies, are maximizing their profit.
In the previous section we modelled a labor market with both private and publiv agencies
and we covered the case of homogenous workers. This assumption is obviously strong if we want
to represent the behavior of firms, workers and employment agencies viz a viz the population
they face. We will now assume that two types of workers exist: Unskilled workers indexed by l
and skilled workers indexed by h.
We start by characterizing the production process (5.1) and the labor market (5.2) in the
presence of skileld and unskilled workers.. We present a quantitative evaluation of this model.
In particular, we condier a situation where the government gives a benefit to the private agencies
to give them an incentive to manage both skilled and unskilled workers (5.3).
5.1 The production process
Each type of agent produces an intermediate good sold on a competitive market and transformed
into a final good. We fix the price of the final good at unity to simplify the notation. Then the
function of the final production is CES and denoted Y
Y = F (Yl, Yh)
=
µ
αY
ρ−1
ρ
l + (1− α)Y
ρ−1
ρ
h
¶ρ/(ρ−1)
where Yi is the total production of intermediate good of type i = l, h. ρ represents the
elasticity of substitution between Yl and Yh, and α represent the relative improtance of Yl in the
final production process.
Due to the assumption of a competitive output market, the price of the intermediate goods
are given by14 :
yl = αY
−1/ρ
l Y
1/ρ
yh = (1− α)Y −1/ρh Y
1/ρ
We exclude capital from the final production process assuming that the use of capital is
isolated to the production of intermediate goods. It is assumed that the wages of skilled workers
are higher than the wages of unskilled workers, and consequently yh > yl.
5.2 The labor market
We assume that there exist one labor market per skill-level. This segmentation of the labor
market is justified by the lack of competition between the less skilled workers (blue collars) and
the more skilled workers (white collars). That means we exclude the possibility of having ladder
eﬀects.
14This specification of the production process has been explored in e.g. Acemoglu (2001).
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The link between the two types of workers is the production process, and works through the
relative labor demands.
The flow equations, and the behavior of workers and firms are identical to the equations of
the previous sections, except they are now indexed by the skill level i = l, h.
On the firms side of the market, the expressions that represent their behavior now read:
rΠiv,j = −hij +mij
¡
θij
¢ £
Πij − Ωij −Πiv,j
¤
rΠij = yi −wij + qij
£
max
©
Πiv,j ,Π
i
v,−j
ª
−Πij
¤
(29)
∀i = l, h ;∀j = g, p et où Ωij = 0 si j = g.
Note that the expected profit from a job now depends on the price pi which is the price of
the intermediate good. This price is equal to the productivity, and is now endogenous.
The labor used in the production of intermediate goods (the intermediate labor demand)
satisfies:
• For a firm using the public agency servicses:
hig
mig
¡
θig
¢ = yi − wig
r + qi
(30)
∀i = l, h
• For a firm using the private agency servicses:
hip
mip
¡
θip
¢ = yi − wip
r + qi
−Ωip (31)
∀i = l, h
The price of a placement takes the exactly the same form as in the previous sections, i.e.:
Ωip = γi
−fi
r + θigm
i
g
¡
θig
¢
+ qia
+ (1− γi)
Ã
yi − wip
r + qi
!
(32)
5.3 Results and Simulations
5.3.1 Calibration
The calibration we do here aims at representing a situation where jobs are only diﬀerentiated
by the skill-level they require. We assume that the destruction rate, the replacement ratio,
bargaining power, vacancy cost, matching functions and characterics of the employment agencies
are the same whatever the skill-level of workers. That is, we fix all the structural parameters,
in order to remove any eﬀect coming from these parameters in the results. The calibration is
exactly the same as that carried out in the previous sections:
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Table 4: Etalonnage des caractéristiques des marchés du travail
hig h
i
p h
i
a f
i Qig Q
i
p Q
i
a φ
i βi
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Table 5: Caractéristiques des agences de placement privées
Concerning the production function we set the elasticity of substitution between skilled and
unskilled workers to ρ = 0.6, using the estimation of Gianella (1999). The weight assigned to
the ntermediate good produced by unskilled workers in the production function (α) is set to
α = 0.4.
The calibration results in a level of productivity (or the price of the intermediate goods) of
unskilled and skilled workers, respectively, of yl = 0.7731 and yh = 4.3186.
The following table describes the "benchmark situation":
Unskilled Skilled
Unemployment rate 13% 5.13%
Unemployment spell 11, 8 months 2, 8 months
Productivity .7731 4.3186
Wage in the public network .7137 4.1729
Wage in the private network .6992 4.1268
Price of placement .1444 .4609
Price of placement (% of the wage) 20.65% 11.17%
We note that even with the same characteristics of the ublic and private agencies, the price
of placement for an unskilled worker is lower than the price of placement for a skilled worker.
Because of the production structure is more favorable to skilled work, firms only have diﬃculties
recuiting skilled labor. Hence, the firms have an incentive to use the private agencies services for
the recruitment of skilled labor, because it is more eﬃcient. The firms using unksilled workers
know that they do not have diﬃculties in recruiting, because of higher unemployment rate.
Therefore, the gain from using private agencies for such firms is low. The number of vacancies
posted at the private agency by the firms using unskilled labor is lower, and hence, the priveate
agencies have no incentive to manage unskilled workers.
Finally, a simple observation of the labor market structure, where all the private agencies
have the same characteristics shows that the workers having the better characteristics ahve easier
access to the private agency services.
5.3.2 Introduction of a subsidy to matching unskilled workers
The matching of an unskilled worker with a vacancy yields low gains to the private agencies. To
make an incentive for these workers it is necessary to increase the gain received by the agencies
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α ρ
.4 .6
Table 6: Etalonnage de la fonction de production finale
from matching these types of workers. We now assume that the government subsidize the match
of an unskilled worker. More precisely, each time a private agency will match an unskilled worker
with a vacancy, it will receive a subsidy Gl in addition to the price of the placement paid by
the firm. Hence, all in all the agency receives Ωl +Gl from matching an unskilled worker to a
vacancy.
The value functions of the firms require no modifications except the value function of the
private agency managing unskilled workers. The value function of for a private agency opening
a file is still Πlv,a, but the value function from managing an unskilled worker is now:
rΠlp,a = −fl + θpmp (θp)
h
Πlv,a +Ωl +Gl −Πlp,a
i
+θlgm
l
g
³
θlg
´ h
Πlv,a −Πlp,a
i
+ qa
h
Πlv,a −Πlp,a
i
(33)
The introduction of the subsidy will have a direct influence on the gains from placement,
but also on the behavioer of firms and contact strategy of the private agency. The price paid
by the firm for a placement of an unskilled worker Ωl is still determined by a bargaining game
between private agencies and firms. It is the solution to the following program:
max
Ωl
nh
−Ωl +Πlp
iγ h
Ωl +Gl −Πlpa
iγo
(34)
The FOC of this program defines the price of the placement when a subsidy exist. It is given
by:
Ωl = γ
Ã
−Gl −
f
r + θlgm
¡
θlg
¢
+ qa
!
+ (1− γ)
Ã
yl −wlp
r + q
!
(35)
The bargained price of the placement is then a decreasing function of the subsidy given by the
government. The higher the subsidy, the lower the price to be paid by firms. We showed in the
previous sections that the decrease in the price of plaement gave firms an incentive to post their
vacancies at the priveate agencies. The decrease in the barganing price Ωl decrease the expected
profit for the private agency of managing a worker. (this follows from (33)). Nevertheless the
subsidy given by the government must balance these two eﬀects. Moreover, because firms post
a higher number of vacancies at the private agencies it is easier for the private agency to find
a job for the unskilled workers, so the placement subsidy seems to have a positive eﬀect on the
placement of unskilled workers.
The simulations confirm this intution. Figure 9 shows the eﬀect of a subsidy to the private
agencies for placing unskilled workers.
The subsidy gives the private agency an incentive to manage unskilled workers. Then the
probability for an unskilled worker to be contacted by a private agency increases, and the price
of the placement decrease with the level of the subsidy. Indeed, it may become negative. This
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Figure 9: Impact of a subsidy for the placement of an unskilled workers Gl.
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result follows from (35):
Ωl < 0
⇐⇒ Gl >
−f
r + θlgmg
¡
θlg
¢
+ qa
+
(1− γ)
γ
yl − wlp
r + q
(36)
Then, when the level of the subsidy Gl becomes higher than the sum of the expected profit
tothe private agency and the expected profit to the firm of matching an unskilled worker, the
price becomes negative. That means that high levels of Gl gives an incentive to hire unskilled
workers. Hiring an usnkilled worker, the firm obtains a subsidy. In turn, the unemployment
rate decreases from 13% to 11.89%. Finally, unskilled workers matched through private agencies
are able to obtain higher wages through the negotiation with the employing firm. Since the
bargained price of the placement is negative the wages bargained by the unskilled workers will
be higher than the wages negotiated by the workers hired through the public agency. Indeed,
the surplus coming from the match between a worker from a private agency and a firm increases:
The firm obtains higher profits and the worker obtains higher wages.
The improvement of the labor market of unskilled workers propagates to the labor market
of skilled workers. This eﬀect is illustrated by figure 10. Indeed, because of better matching of
unskilled workers the demand for unskilled labor increases, and the number of unskilled workers
in jobs increases, thereby decreasing the productivity of unskilled labor, but increasing the global
production. This leads to an increase in the demand for skilled labor. In this case, the interest
of the private employment agency in skilled workers increases: It manages more skilled workers
because of an higher expected profit for this type of workers. Then firms post more skilled
vacancies at the private agency and the unemployment rate of skilled workers falls, so the labor
market of skilled workers benefits from the subsidy as well.
Nevertheless, several obstacles might occur. First, the cost for the government can be pro-
hibitively high. Indeed the initial price of the placement is 0.1444 for unskilled workers and
0.4609 for skilled workes. We simulated here subsidies ranging from 0 to 4.3 times the intial
price for the placement of an unskileld worker. The decreas in the unemployment rate can raise
1.1 percentage point for the highest simulated subsidy. For the lower subsidies, the eﬀect of the
unemployment rate of course are lower. Finally, workers who do not come come into contact
with a private agency face a risk of being marginalized in the labor market, because the firms
post few vacancies in the public agencies.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have studied the impact of a private employment agency, functioning on the
principle of the temporary work agencies. The introduction of such an intermediary on the
labor market makes it possible to reduce the unemployment rate. The more eﬃcient the private
agency is the more the unemployment rate decreases. The eﬀect on the aggregate welfare is
positive. Indeed, the presence of an eﬃcient private agency encourages the firm to post there
their vacancies there, which increases the chances of unemployed to find a job. The private
employment agency play the role of an additional intermediary on the labor market. Empirical
data has illustrated the fact that the use of several methods of research of employment increases
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the probability of exit from unemployment. We confirm this finding: the coexistence of a public
and a private agency contributes to increase the exit rate from unemployment.
We show that the private employment agencies will be more present in the labor market as
the level of unemployment benefits are lowered and that the bargaining power of the workers
are lowered. We thus highlight a crowding-out eﬀect of unemployment insurance on the pri-
vate placement. A rise in the unemployment benefits improves the instantaneous gains of the
unemployed but reduces their access to the private network of placement.
The behavior of the firms which open vacancies in private agencies determines also the
eﬃciency of the competition on the market for job placement. We show in particular that if
the price of the placement results from a process of bargaining, a too weak bargaining power of
the firms does not encourage them to choose the most eﬃcient agency because of the price to
pay. Conversely, a strong bargaining power of the firms will discourage the employment agencies
because of a lower expected profit. Finally, the presence of an inbalance during the bargaining
can have a negative impact on unemployment. The government can have interest to fix itself
the price of the placement to ensure the most eﬀective system in term of keeping unemployment
low.
Finally, we considered two types of workers: skilled workers and unskilled workers. Unskilled
jobs are easier to fill than the skilled jobs because of a higher unemployment rate for the unskilled
workers. The firms are not motivated to pay a private agency to recruit this type of workers. On
the contrary, the skilled workers are fewer; while passing by a private agency, the firms expect to
fill their skilled vacant jobs more quickly than by the public agency. The price they agree to pay
is higher for skilled workers. In such a situation, private employment agencies can loose interest
in the placement of less skilled unemployed workers because they are diﬃcult to place in a job
and source of less expected gains than the skilled unemployed ones. We show that the payment
of a subsidy to the placement of a unskilled worker makes it possible to encourage the private
employment agencies to enter the market of this type of workers. However, this system does not
reduce the unemployment rate of unskilled workers significantly, because of the structural eﬀect
of the labor demand.
Considering one agency by skill constitutes obviously a limit of this model. Sub-contracting
the placement of less skilled unemployed workers by proposing an increased remuneration with
the diﬃculty of employability of the workers (as in France), can be an alternative solution. Then
remains to define an optimal price of placement
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Appendix
A- Comparative statics when wages are exogenous
To study the properties of the comparative statics, we need to rewrite the relations (11), (12)
and (13) in the following way:
mg (θg) =
hg (r + q)
y −w
mp (θp) =
hp (r + q)
y − w − (r + q)Ω
ma (θa) =
ha [r + qa + θgmg (θg) + θpmp (θp)]
−f + θpmp (θp)Ω
• Impact of hg
With (11), we have:
dθg
dhg
=
r + q
(y − w)m0g (θg)
< 0
And (13) implies :
dθa
dhg
=
ha
£
mg (θg) + θgm0g (θg)
¤
[−f + θpmp (θp)Ω]m0a (θa)
dθg
dhg
Recall that θpmp (θp)Ω > f according to (14), we obtain then:
dθa
dhg
> 0
• Impact of hp
Relation (12) implies:
dθp
dhp
=
r + q
[y − w − (r + q)Ω]m0p (θp)
< 0
Indeed, the condition y > w + (r + q)Ω is necessarily satified. Conversely, if the firms expect a
negative profit on a filled job, they will not post a vacancy in a private agency.
We infer from that:
dθa
dhp
= −
ha
£
mp (θp) + θpm0p (θp)
¤
[−f + θpmp (θp)Ω]2m0a (θa)
(f +Ω [r + qa + θgmg (θg)])
dθp
dhp
dθa
dhp
< 0
• Impact of ha
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θg and θp do not depend on ha. Consequently, only the relation (13) is modified :
dθa
dha
=
r + qa + θgmg (θg) + θpmp (θp)
[−f + θpmp (θp)Ω]m0a (θa)
< 0
• Eﬀect of w
dθg
dw
=
hg (r + q)
[y − w]2m0g (θg)
< 0
dθp
dw
=
hp (r + q)
[y − w − (r + q)Ω]2m0p (θp)
< 0
dθa
dw
=
ha
£
mg (θg) + θgm0g (θg)
¤
[−f + θpmp (θp)Ω]m0a (θa)
dθg
dw| {z }
Postive eﬀect
−
ha
£
mp (θp) + θpm0p (θp)
¤
[−f + θpmp (θp)Ω]2m0a (θa)
(f +Ω [r + qa + θgmg (θg)])
dθp
dw| {z }
Negative eﬀect
• Eﬀect of q
dθg
dq
=
hg
(y − w)m0g (θg)
< 0
dθp
dq
=
hp
[y − w − (r + q)Ω]m0p (θp)
< 0
dθa
dq
=
ha
£
mg (θg) + θgm0g (θg)
¤
[−f + θpmp (θp)Ω]m0a (θa)
dθg
dq| {z }
Postive eﬀect
−
ha
£
mp (θp) + θpm0p (θp)
¤
[−f + θpmp (θp)Ω]2m0a (θa)
(f +Ω [r + qa + θgmg (θg)])
dθp
dq| {z }
Negative eﬀect
• Eﬀect of y
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dθg
dy
= − hg (r + q)
[y − w]2m0g (θg)
> 0
dθp
dy
= − hp (r + q)
[y − w − (r + q)Ω]2m0p (θp)
> 0
dθa
dy
=
ha
£
mg (θg) + θgm0g (θg)
¤
[−f + θpmp (θp)Ω]m0a (θa)
dθg
dy| {z }
Negative eﬀect
−
ha
£
mp (θp) + θpm0p (θp)
¤
[−f + θpmp (θp)Ω]2m0a (θa)
(f +Ω [r + qa + θgmg (θg)])
dθp
dy| {z }
Postive eﬀect
• Eﬀect of Qp
An improvement of the eﬃciency of the private matching process Qp generates an increase
in the number of hirings in the economy. This increases the probability of filling a vancancy and
decreases the average cost of a vacancy. In response, firms post more vacancies.
dθp
dQp
> 0
dθa
dQp
= −
ha
£
mp (θp) + θpm0p (θp)
¤
[−f + θpmp (θp)Ω]2m0a (θa)
(f +Ω [r + qa + θgmg (θg)])
dθp
dQp
dθa
dQp
> 0
• Eﬀect of Ω
dθp
dΩ
=
hp (r + q)
2
[y − w − (r + q)Ω]2m0p (θp)
< 0
dθa
dΩ
= −ha [r + qa + θgmg (θg) + θpmp (θp)] θpmp (θp)
[−f + θpmp (θp)Ω]2m0a (θa)| {z }
Positive eﬀect
−
ha
£
mp (θp) + θpm0p (θp)
¤
[−f + θpmp (θp)Ω]2m0a (θa)
(f +Ω [r + qa + θgmg (θg)])
dθp
dΩ| {z }
Negative eﬀect
B- Bargaining on a contribution rate
If the firms have a contribution on wages to pay, the expected gains rewrites:
rΠp = y − (1 + σ)wp + q (Max (Πvp, 0)−Πp)
rΠvp = −hp +mp (θp) [Πp −Πvp]
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The payoﬀs of the private agency are more modified because of the existence of a permanent
income following the placement. Like previously, private agencies continue with searching unem-
ployed workers. When they find a job seeker, the expected profit from a managed unemployed
worker does not write in the same way:
rΠp,a = −f + θpmp (θp) [Πe,a −Πp,a] + θgmg (θg) [Πv,a −Πp,a] + qa [Πv,a −Πp,a] (37)
where Πe,a is the profit expected from a placement of a worker in a firm. This expected
profit writes:
rΠe,a = σwp + q (Max (Πv,a, 0)−Πe,a) (38)
The expected profit (37) rewrites then:
Πp,a =
−f + θpmp (θp)Πe,a
r + θgmg (θg) + θpmp (θp) + qa
(39)
=
−f (r + q) + θpmp (θp)σwp
(r + q) (r + θgmg (θg) + θpmp (θp) + qa)
During the bargaining on a contribution rate, the level of contribution comes from the
following program:
σ = argmax
n
(Πp −Πv)γ (Πea −Πpa)1−γ
o
(40)
The sharing of the surplus is defined by:
γ (Πea −Πpa) = (1− γ) (Πp −Πv)
µ
r + θgm (θg) + qa
r + θgm (θg) + θpm (θp) + qa
¶
(41)
The price of the placement satisfies:
σwp = γ
−f (r + q)
r + θgm (θg) + qa
+ (1− γ) (y − wp)
= (r + q)Ω
To conclude, if firms and agencies bargain on a contribution rate, the final price of placement
is exactly the same as if firms and agencies bargain on a unique price paid at the moment of the
placement.
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